One of the growing areas of concern for the board of directors of many
community associations across the country is how to handle requests by
handicapped residents and prospective residents regarding the designation of
parking spaces close to their homes or their front doors, for their exclusive
use. The failure to properly respond to these requests can land the
association in an extremely expensive law suit funded by public interest
groups which may or may not be covered by the association's insurance carrier.
Six figure judgments and settlements are not uncommon when a handicapped
resident or a group of handicapped residents file claims against associations
that do not accommodate their request for the designation of convenient
parking spaces for their use.
A major stumbling block for many directors is the lack of clear authority
for them to designate parking spaces for the handicapped residents who request
convenient spaces. Directors will generally check their governing documents to
determine whether they can accommodate the handicapped resident's request.
When they do not see any supporting authority for displacing a non-handicapped
person from the convenient parking space, they innocently inform the
handicapped resident that they cannot give them the convenient parking space
that has been requested. Sometime after that they are greeted by a process
server and find that they have been named as defendants along with their
association for discrimination against the handicapped resident in violation
of the Fair Housing Administration Act.
Under the Fair Housing Administration Act (the "FHAA"), it is
unlawful "[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services
or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of that
person." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Discrimination under the FHAA
includes; 1) refusing to permit a handicapped person to make "reasonable
modifications" to his/her living areas which are necessary to enable
him/her to have "full enjoyment of the premises," 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(A), or 2) refusing to "make reasonable accommodations in
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Although the FHAA
places the burden of paying for "reasonable modifications" under
subsection (A) on the handicapped individual, it is silent as to who must pay
for "reasonable accommodations" required in subsection (B). Courts
have interpreted section 3604(f)(3)(B) as not only imposing an affirmative
duty upon housing providers to reasonably accommodate the needs of handicapped
persons but, in certain circumstances, as requiring them to assume reasonable
financial burdens in accommodating these handicapped residents.
Last year a federal District Court in New Jersey issued a ruling that is
instructive of the current trend in FHAA discrimination cases faced by
community associations. In the case of Gittleman v. Woodhaven Condominium
Association, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 894 (D. NJ 1997), the court ruled that
condominium associations may be tried for discrimination under the FHAA for
failing to accommodate a resident's request for an exclusive convenient
parking space on the common elements of the condominium. Mr. Gittleman
requested exclusive use of a parking space to accommodate his handicap. The
board refused his request in reliance on the terms of the Master Deed of the
association which provided that: "the parking spaces within the lands
described in Paragraph 1 of this Master Deed shall constitute common elements
for the non-exclusive use of the unit owners." Id. at 895. It was the
board's position that they could not grant Mr. Gittleman's request without an
amendment of the Master Deed, which would require the approval of two-thirds
of the members of the association. The board placed the issue before the
membership but it did not receive the support of the required two-thirds vote
to amend the Master Deed in order to sustain Mr. Gittleman's request.
Subsequent to the failure of the attempted amendment, Mr. Gittleman sued the
association for discrimination under the FHAA.
The court clearly recognized that this case was "complicated by the
fact that the parking spaces are owned by the condominium unit owners as
tenants in common." Id. at 897. The association argued that it was unable
to grant Mr. Gittleman's request because the parking spaces were common
elements for the non-exclusive use of all of the unit owners. As such, the
association argued that it was not free to assign an exclusive parking space
in derogation of the rights of the other unit owners at the condominium,
without an amendment of the Master Deed. Indeed the court agreed with the
association "that the Master Deed expressly provides that parking spaces
in the condominium are common elements for the non-exclusive use of the unit
owners." (Master Deed 6(b)). The Court also agrees with the association
that the Master Deed precludes the association from granting an exclusive
parking space to a handicapped unit owner without the prior approval of at
least two-thirds of the unit owner's votes entitled to be cast." Id. at
899. However, the court went on to say that under federal housing law the
association is "duty bound to: (1) avoid enforcing provisions of the
Master Deed that have discriminatory effects; and (2) regulate the use of the
common elements so as to comply with the requirements of the FHAA." Id.
The court based its finding on the grounds that "to the extent the Master
Deed contains provisions that, either on their face or as applied, violate the
FHAA, they cannot be enforced as written . . . ." Id. Hence, the court
found that the association could be found liable for discrimination under the
FHAA for enforcing its Master Deed in a manner that had the net effect of
discriminating against a handicapped resident, and that denying a handicapped
resident a convenient parking space constituted a discriminatory failure to
make a reasonable accommodation for Mr. Gittleman.
The court in Gittleman was influenced by the ruling in Shapiro v. Cadman
Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328 (2nd Cir. 1995), where the Second Circuit considered
whether a housing cooperative in New York City was required to allocate to a
handicapped tenant a parking space in her building, even if the cooperative
had to incur the additional costs to accommodate her. In this case, like
Gittleman, parking in the cooperative was on a first-come first-serve basis
and there were fewer parking spaces than there were residents of the
cooperative. Although there was a waiting list by which one could apply for a
parking space, the court held that the cooperative must provide the
handicapped resident with the space immediately, even if the cooperative had
to incur costs in doing so.
In holding that the cooperative could be charged with the costs of such
"reasonable accommodation," the court focused on the legislative
history of the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHAA. Specifically, it
found that Congress intended to mirror the provisions in and draw on case law
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which prohibits
federally-funded programs from discriminating on the basis of handicap and
requires such programs to reasonably accommodate an otherwise qualified
individual's handicap. Id. at 334. The court noted that unlike in Title VII,
"reasonable accommodations" under the Rehabilitation Act could
involve costs and that the cooperative could "be required to incur
reasonable costs to accommodate [its resident's] handicap, provided such
accommodations do not pose an undue hardship or substantial burden." Id.
at 335.
In this case, evidence presented at trial indicated that the cooperative
would not be substantially burdened or subject to undue hardship by providing
the resident with a space immediately. Specifically, the court upheld the
lower court's findings that; 1) the tenant suffered from multiple sclerosis
and, without a parking space in her building, was subject to continued risk of
injury and humiliation from her inability to walk distances and incontinence
suffered as a result of her multiple sclerosis; 2) three parking spaces in the
tenant's building were allocated to employees of the cooperative; 3)
commercial garages were located nearby to which the employees could be
relocated at a "de minimis cost" (it cost $185 more per month to
lease a space in the nearby commercial garage); and; 4) the cooperative could
free up seven spaces by enforcing its rule that only one parking space be
allocated per unit and that spaces go only to residents.
Finally, in requiring the cooperative to give its handicapped tenant a
parking space in the building at the cooperative's expense of moving an
employee to a commercial garage, the court stressed how the "reasonable
accommodation" was a necessary part of the resident's use and enjoyment
of her dwelling. "Without a nearby parking space, [the resident] is
subject to a risk of injury, infection and humiliation each time she leaves
her dwelling and each time she returns home.... [U]nder these circumstances,
nearby parking is a substantial factor in [the resident's] 'use and enjoyment'
of her dwelling." Id.
In United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d
1413 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit also held that in some instances,
providers of residential housing must bear the costs related to the
"reasonable accommodation" requirement of section 3604(f)(3)(B).
Here a resident of a mobile home park sued her landlord for imposing guest
fees for her handicapped daughter's home health care aide. In reversing and
remanding the lower court's decision that the mobile home park was not
required to waive these fees, which are generally applicable to all residents,
the court focused on the legislative history of the FHAA noting, as the Second
Circuit did in Shapiro, that "Congress anticipated that landlords would
have to shoulder certain costs involved [with accommodating the needs of
handicapped persons], so long as they are not unduly burdensome." Id. at
1416.
The court then announced that to trigger review under section 3604(f)(3)(B)
... a fee must ... have the potential to deny persons an 'equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling' because of their handicap. There are, of course,
many types of residential fees that affect handicapped and non-handicapped
residents equally; such fees are proper. Fees that merit closer scrutiny are
those with unequal impact, imposed in return for permission to engage in
conduct that, under the FHAA, a landlord is required to permit. Id. at
1416-17.
Once review is triggered, "a reviewing court should examine, among
other things, the amount of fees imposed, the relationship between the amount
of fees and the overall housing cost, the proportion of tenants paying such
fees, the importance of the fees to the landlord's overall revenues, and the
importance of the fee waiver to the handicapped tenant." The court
emphasized that whether a provider must pay for the costs of a reasonable
accommodation is to be determined on a case-by-case basis considering whether
it "may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity
to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. at 1418.
In Jankowski Lee & Associates, et al. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3rd 891 (7th
Cir. 1996) the court ruled that when an apartment complex refused to alter its
parking policies to allow a handicapped resident to park as close as possible
to his apartment, it violated the FHAA. Indeed the court found the owner and
manager of the apartment complex liable for discrimination for failing to
accommodate the request of the handicapped plaintiff. The string of cases
finding that apartment complex failures to alter parking policies for
handicapped persons constitutes discrimination under the FHAA is also
applicable to community associations. For example the court in Martinez v.
Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., 189 Ariz. 206, 941 P.2d
218 (1997) ruled that condominium associations occupy a status similar to that
of landlords and thus have similar liability.
If an association is found to have engaged in discriminatory conduct based
on its reliance on the perceived duty to abide by the terms of their governing
documents, the association may be exposed to liability for the attorney's fees
of the plaintiff in addition to its own legal costs. It is noteworthy that a
finding of a violation of the FHAA does not require a showing of
discriminatory intent. Trovato v. City of Manchester, New Hampshire, 992
F.Supp. 493 (D. NH 1997). Hence, an innocent attempt to enforce the covenants
of an association can easily cause a board to place their association in harms
way. Once a court determines that the association has violated the FHAA by
failing to provide a reasonable accommodation, the association is subject to
liability for the attorney's fees of the plaintiff. (See Keith v. Volpe, 644
F.Supp. 1317 (C.D. CA 1986).)
The danger here is that there are a growing number of public advocacy
groups who employ major firms to provide "pro bono" services on
behalf of aggrieved handicapped persons. The plaintiff's attorneys then
generate substantial legal bills, which are charged to the violating
association. Often these legal bills exceed any prospective compensatory
damages by an extremely large margin. In some cases, an association may find
itself responsible for $100,000 to $300,000 in legal fees in a case where the
plaintiff's pecuniary injuries are estimated to be negligible or non-existent.
If the association does not have insurance coverage for this liability, the
staggering legal fees can cripple it.
It goes without saying that many board members of community associations
are volunteers who have little or no formal training in the intricacies of
association management. Directors tend to rely on the gospel as presented in
their governing documents. This can lead to disastrous results when a
handicapped resident makes a request for an accommodation that is not
sanctioned by the governing documents. That is why it is important to be aware
that the terms of an association's documents are likely to be found to be
subordinate to the terms of the FHAA by a reviewing court: Directors should
apply their documents in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of
the FHAA.
As long as the board or the association has control of the use of the
parking spaces at the association, (i.e., the parking spaces are general
common elements at a condominium or are common area property at a homeowners
association), the board should be aware that they may be obliged to
accommodate the handicapped resident or prospective resident's request in
compliance with the FHAA. If, on the other hand, the parking spaces are
controlled by the individual unit owners, such as where the parking spaces are
individually owned condominium units or limited common elements assigned to a
unit, then there is little to no risk of a violation of the FHAA by the board
of directors. In those cases, the board would lack the capacity to accommodate
the request for a more convenient parking space because the association cannot
control the assignment of those parking spaces.
So, what can an association's board or manager do to avoid a costly
lawsuit? The first thing that should be done is to have a plan in place now,
before a request is even received. Draft a sample written response to be used
when a request is received, and have it approved by the association's counsel.
When the association is faced with a request by a handicapped resident or
prospective resident for a convenient parking space, you can promptly inform
the person in writing that you will begin investigating the possibilities of a
solution. Needless to say, when the association receives the request, the
board should consult with their counsel regarding the appropriate response to
accommodate that request. Ignoring the request or responding improperly can be
a very costly error.
After the association has consulted with their attorney and has drafted an
acceptable response, the manager or board should take the next logical step in
the development of the plan; review the options. Read the governing documents
and determine if the parking is designated Common Element, Reserve Common
Element, Limited Common Element, individually owned, or some combination of
these. Once the association has determined who controls or owns the parking,
it can work with counsel to develop appropriate options which can be offered
to accommodate a request. A few practical solutions could include:
- If parking is Common Element, the board can assign a space close to the
home (or building entrance) as a Reserve Common Element for the exclusive
use of the handicapped resident. Proper signage should be installed, and a
parking permit issued.
- If parking is not Common Element, consider alternative possibilities
such as visitor parking, short term parking, reserved (but not
"owned") resident parking, contractor or staff parking. It is
easy to reassign one of these spaces as Reserve Common Element for the
exclusive use of the handicapped resident. If you displace another
resident or staff person to accomplish this, the association should find
an alternative place for that person to park, even if that means paying a
fee.
- Look at undesignated Common Elements on the property that could be
assigned as Reserve Common Element parking. There may be areas that are
not currently used for parking which can easily be assigned. If
conveniently located, the newly created spaces can be used by the
handicapped resident, if not, in can be used to relocate the displaced
vehicle from paragraph 2.
- If all parking is Limited Common Element or is controlled by the unit
owners (not the association), again, try to find an alternative place to
create a space. If there is absolutely no alternative, write a "good
faith" letter to the owners who have a conveniently located space.
Ask each owner if they would be interested in exchanging their
conveniently accessible space for the inconvenient space of the
handicapped resident or purchaser. If an owner is agreeable, make sure
that the transfer is recorded in the County records. If the exchange is
not going to be permanent, make sure the parties involved have an attorney
draw up a document outlining the temporary exchange, or a rental
agreement.
The most important things to remember are: be prepared by having a plan in
place now; have the plan approved by counsel; and, when you get a request to
accommodate the parking needs of a handicapped resident or purchaser, respond
quickly, and with the approval of counsel.